On the Coordination of Value-Maximizing Bidders

Abstract: While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among multiple distinct bidders managed by a third-party bidding agent, and strategic bid selection for multiple ad campaigns managed by a single advertiser. We formalize this coordination problem as a theoretical model and demonstrate that a straightforward coordination mechanism, where only the highest-value bidder competes with outside bids, strictly dominates independent bidding, improving both Return-on-Spend (RoS) compliance and the total value accrued for each participating auto-bidder or ad campaign. Additionally, our simulations on synthetic and real-world datasets support the theoretical result that coordinated mechanism outperforms independent bidding. These findings highlight both the theoretical potential and the practical robustness of coordination in auto-bidding in online auctions.