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Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes
Published 26 Apr 2024 in cs.GT and econ.TH | (2404.17413v4)
Abstract: The Plurality rule for linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those orders, while the Anti-Plurality rule selects the alternatives least often occurring in the final position. We explore extensions of these rules to partial orders, offering axiomatic characterisations for these extensions.\ \textbf{Keywords:} Plurality, Anti-Plurality, Strict Partial Orders, Voting.
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