Sense-Giving Strategies of Media Organisations in Social Media Disaster Communication: Findings from Hurricane Harvey
Abstract: Media organisations are essential communication stakeholders in social media disaster communication during extreme events. They perform gatekeeper and amplification roles which are crucial for collective sense-making processes. In that capacity, media organisations distribute information through social media, use it as a source of information, and share such information across different channels. Yet, little is known about the role of media organisations on social media as supposed sense-givers to effectively support the creation of mutual sense. This study investigates the communication strategies of media organisations in extreme events. A Twitter dataset consisting of 9,414,463 postings was collected during Hurricane Harvey in 2017. Social network and content analysis methods were applied to identify media communication approaches. Three different sense-giving strategies could be identified: retweeting of local in-house outlets; bound amplification of messages of individual to the organisation associated journalists; and open message amplification.
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Knowledge Gaps
Below is a single, consolidated list of concrete knowledge gaps, limitations, and open questions left unresolved by the paper that future researchers could act on:
- Platform scope: Findings are Twitter-only; the cross-platform dynamics with Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Reddit, and broadcast/website channels remain unexamined.
- Temporal coverage: Data covers only six days (Aug 26–31, 2017); impacts of pre-event buildup and long-tail recovery phases are missing.
- Crisis typology generalizability: Results stem from a predictable, weather-forecasted disaster; it is unclear if identified strategies transfer to sudden, unpredictable crises (e.g., terror attacks, earthquakes).
- Language and geography: English-only collection likely excludes significant communities; international media were absent in the power-user sample—are strategies different across languages/regions?
- Keyword dependence: Using only “hurricaneharvey,” “harvey,” “hurricane” risks both missing relevant hashtags/terms (e.g., #HoustonFlood, #HarveyRelief, local place names) and including noise; sensitivity analyses are needed.
- Data completeness and reproducibility: The paper does not specify API endpoints, rate-limit handling, or sampling bias checks; the dataset is not shared for replication.
- Retweet-centric influence: Influence is approximated via retweet in-degree; quote tweets, replies, mentions, impressions, follower networks, and algorithmic feed exposure are not incorporated.
- Power-user sampling bias: Focusing on top 100 power users per day and on media/journalists neglects the “long tail,” potentially missing grassroots sense-giving and niche authorities.
- Network modeling limits: Analyses model only retweet graphs; reply/mention networks, community structures (e.g., modularity), structural holes, and cross-community bridging are not explored.
- Temporal diffusion dynamics: No modeling of time-resolved diffusion cascades (who amplifies whom, when), nor of lag between local and national outlets.
- Measurement validity: Betweenness and in-degree are reported without robustness checks (e.g., alternative centralities, bootstrapping) or tests of statistical significance.
- Strategy effectiveness: The study identifies three amplification strategies but does not evaluate their effects on outcomes (e.g., faster information reach, reduced uncertainty, behavioral compliance, rumor suppression).
- Content accuracy and verification: Accuracy/credibility of amplified content—especially in open amplification—was not assessed; assumptions about “bound amplification = quality assurance” remain untested.
- Misinformation dynamics: The role of media strategies in amplifying, containing, or correcting rumors and falsehoods is not examined.
- Organizational processes: Internal decision rules, editorial policies, staffing, tooling (dashboards, verification workflows), and resource constraints driving strategy choices are unknown.
- National–local coordination: Observed asymmetries (e.g., ABC News not retweeting @abc13houston) are not explained; incentives, brand risk, and policy constraints require investigation.
- Audience reception and trust: Public perceptions (trust, sentiment), engagement quality, and the impact on sense-making among different audience segments are not measured.
- Bot/coordinated activity: Potential effects of bots, coordinated campaigns, or harassment on amplification patterns and media behavior are not assessed.
- Geospatial granularity: No geolocation analysis of content or of reporter distribution; spatial coverage and information equity across affected neighborhoods are not evaluated.
- Hashtag solicitation risks: The #ABC13Eyewitness call-to-action’s susceptibility to spam, malicious content, privacy/safety concerns, and moderation workload is not analyzed.
- Theoretical operationalization: Sense-giving is invoked but not operationally measured; interactions with sense-demanding and sense-breaking are not modeled or tested.
- Comparative scope: A single US case limits external validity; cross-event, cross-hazard, and cross-country comparisons are needed to test strategy universality.
- EMA applicability: The recommendation that EMAs emulate media strategies is speculative; controlled evaluations are needed to test feasibility, benefits, and risks for EMAs.
- Post-2017 platform changes: Twitter’s product/policy shifts (e.g., algorithmic timeline changes, verification policies, API access) may affect replicability; longitudinal reassessment is needed.
- Ethical considerations: The use and rebroadcast of eyewitness content raises consent, safety, and equity issues that are not addressed.
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